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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DEBORAH DEANNE LAFAVE 
aka GRASSER 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 43170 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2014-17499 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Lafave failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either 
by imposing concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with four years fixed, upon her 
guilty pleas to two counts of grand theft, or by denying her Rule 35 motion for reduction 
of her sentences? 
 
 
Lafave Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Lafave pled guilty to two counts of grand theft and the district court imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with four years fixed.  (R., pp.51-55.)  Lafave 
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.56-58.)  She also 
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filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  
(Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave; Memorandum Decision and 
Order 1) Denying Rule 35 Motion; and 2) Granting Additional Credit for Time Served 
(Augmentations).)   
Lafave asserts her sentences are excessive in light of her mental health issues, 
support from family and friends, and purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.)  The 
record supports the sentences imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for grand theft is 14 years.  I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a).  
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with four years 
fixed, which fall well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.51-55.)  At sentencing, the 
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district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also 
set forth its reasons for imposing Lafave’s sentences.  (Tr., p.30, L.14 – p.34, L.15.)  
The state submits that Lafave has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons 
more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which 
the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
Lafave next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence, in light of her participation in programs while 
incarcerated, concern for her parents, employment potential, continued family support, 
and because she was continuing to take her mental health medications.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.6-8.)  The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Lafave’s Rule 35 motion. 
 Rule 35 provides both that a district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after 
judgment and that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days after judgment.  
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 
motion within a “reasonable time” after the expiration of the 120 days.  State v. 
Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992).  If, however, the trial court fails 
to rule upon the motion “within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day 
period, the trial court loses jurisdiction.”  Id. at 354, 825 P.2d at 77.  In addition, it is the 
movant’s responsibility to “precipitate action on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable 
time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for the delay, to 
avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction.”  State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 619, 
977 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186, 953 P.2d 
624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998)); State v. Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197 n.2, 953 P.2d 636, 637 
n.2 (Ct. App. 1998).   
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Lafave filed her Rule 35 motion 117 days after judgment was entered.  (R., p. 51; 
8/4/15 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave (Augmentation).)  The 
district court had a “reasonable time” to rule on the motion; however it failed to rule until 
174 days after the motion was filed. (Memorandum Decision and Order 1) Denying Rule 
35 Motion; and 2) Granting Additional Credit for Time Served (Augmentations).)   
Because nothing in the record justifies such a lengthy delay, the court had no 
jurisdiction, 292 days after the entry of judgment, to rule on the motion.  The order 
denying Lafave’s Rule 35 motion should be affirmed because the district court lost 
jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to rule on the motion.  
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Lafave’s claim, Lafave has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.  In its order denying Lafave’s Rule 35 motion, the 
district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also 
set forth in detail its reasons for denying Lafave’s motion.  The state submits that Lafave 
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the 
district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order 1) Denying Rule 35 Motion; and 2) 
Granting Additional Credit for Time Served, which the state adopts as its argument on 
appeal. (Appendix B.) 
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Lafave’s conviction and 
sentence and the district court’s order denying Lafave’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence. 
       
 DATED this 23rd day of March, 2016. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_Lori A. Fleming ___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ALICIA HYMAS 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of March, 2016, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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STA TE OF IDAHO. vs. DEBORAH D. LAFAVE aka GRASSER DOCKET NO: 431. 70 
1 ~rtlcular r.olnt. And I think that she deserves a llttte 1 Is there some statement you would like to make, 
2 t of credit for that anyway. 2 ma'am? 
3 She would like the Court to consider something 3 THI: DEFENDANT: The only statement I had is the 
4 other than a priSO!l sentence. She understands that 4 one I wrote out that you have a copy of. 
5 prison's deflnlte~ on the table. She's hoping the Court 5 THE COURT: All right. I've read that. 
6 won't go that far. She's more than wtlllng to 6 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. That's·· I wrote that 
7 participate In a retained jurisdiction If that's what the 7 out before I knew It was going to be in the PSI, so •• 
8 Court would deem appropriate. 8 THE COURT: Arhing beyond that, ma'am? 
9 She's more hopeful, though, that the Court would 9 THE DEFENDAN : No, sir. 
10 consider placing her on probation after some period of 10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
11 time in the Ada County Jail as punishment. 11 Mr. Lorello, are you aware of any reason why the 
12 Regarding the underlying sentence, Judge, with 12 Court cannot proceed to sentencing? 
13 the restitution figure being as significant as It Is, 13 MR. LORELLO: No, Your Honor. 
14 we'd leave the Indeterminate ~rtion to the Court's 14 THE COURT: Ms, Grasser, on your gull~ plea to 
15 discretion. If the Court is Incl ned to enter a 15 these two felony charges of grand theft, I fin , ma'am, 
16 sentence, we would ask that the State •• or that the 16 lhat you are guilly. 
17 Court enter a two-year fixed sentence and no more than 17 What aggravates your conduct in this case, 
18 that and an Indeterminate sentence as long as the Court 18 ma'am, Is that you'd been previously sentenced to prison 
19 would calculate it would take her to pay back the 19 as an embezzler. From the presentence materials it 
20 restitution. 20 appears that iou were responslble for taking on the order 
21 Thank you, Your Honor. 21 of $130,000 rom a prior employer. Apparently in 
22 THE COURT: Thank riou, Mr. Lorello. 22 Washington that wlll land 11 months In prison these days. 
23 Ms. Grasser, before tie Court proceeds to 23 You served that sentence, you moved to Idaho and 
24 sentencing, you have the right to make any statement you 24 got yourself In a position where you got control or 
25 would like. 25 ahlllty to Influence the handling of money and credit In 
29 30 
1 your business. 1 The first factor is whether there is an undue 
2 You were highly trusted, and you used many 2 risk that during a period of a suspended sentence of your 
3 different forms of fraudulent behavior to support 3 probation that you wlll commit another crime. I find 
4 yourself In a way that your normal wages wouldn't have 4 that that factor ls present In ~our case. 
5 permitted you to do. 5 The next factor Is whet er you are In need of 
6 I've read these letters from your husband and 6 correctional treatment that can be provided most 
7 other family members who are very supportive, seem to 7 effectlvell by commitment to an Institution. I find that 
8 tliink that you would thrive in an environment of 8 that Is a actor in this case. 
9 treatment and medlcaUon. All have asked for leniency on 9 The next (actor ls whether a lesser sentence 
10 your behalf. 10 will depreciate the seriousness of your crime. I would 
11 rm aware that you, from the mental health 11 nnd that a sentence of probation In this case would 
12 evaluation, lhat you have a number of mental health 12 significantly and seriously depreciate the seriousness of 
13 issues, Including btlar and anxiety disorder. 13 your reoffense In this case in Idaho. 
14 It Is difficult or me to gra1o how you can have 14 The next factor Is whether Imprisonment will 
15 a crimlnogenlc risk assessment one and be considered 15 provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to you. And 
16 onlh a moderate risk to reoffend when you have reoffended 16 I find that that Is a factor In this case. You will be 
17 Int ils way after •• and as going to prison for this same 17 speclncally punished If I send you to prison In a way 
18 offense In the state of Washington. 18 that you will not if I placed you on probation. 
19 Your attorney has suggested that perhaps 19 The next factor Is whether Imprisonment wlll 
20 probation or a period of retain jurisdiction would be 20 provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the 
21 appropriate. 21 community. You always hope that a sentence has that 
22 I've reviewed the factors In Idaho Code Section 22 effect, but I don't know If there's any empirical 
23 19·2521 which control whr.thr.r thr. Court should consider 23 evidence that It has that effect, so I find that Is a 
24 you for placement In the community or for placement in 24 neutral factor as applied In this case. 
25 prison. 25 And last factor is whether you are a multiple 
31 32 
KASEY REDLICH, CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER 
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STATE OF IDAHO VS. DEBORAH D, LAFA VE aka GRASSER DOCKET NO: 4 31 70 
1 offender or a professional criminal. I don't know that I 1 For that reason, I come to this decision, ma'am. 
2 could characterize you as a professional crlminal, but 2 I feel -· find that a sentence of imprisonment in your 
3 you are a multiple embezzler from different employers, 3 case Is a~ropriate. It will protect the publlc. It 
4 and having been previously sentenced to setve a term of 4 will rovi e adequate deterrence to you. I would like to 
s Imprisonment has not deterred your conduct. 5 thin that after you spend a si~nlftcant amount of time 
6 And so at the end of the day, ma'am, my most 6 In prison In Idaho you will thin very hard about 
7 important function of this Is protection of the public. 7 victimizin~ another employer in your career. 
8 I have no confidence that the public Is going to be 8 I wl enter a Judgment of conviction on both 
9 protected If I again permit you to go Into the community. 9 counts. As to the first count, I will sentence you to 
10 And for that reason I don't feel that a sentence of 10 the custody of the state board of correction for a term 
11 probation would be appropriate, and I won't order 11 of 14 years, consisting of four years fixed followed by 
12 probation In your case. 12 ten years Indeterminate. 
13 Your counsel has suggested that I should 13 As to the second count, I will Impose a 
14 consider a period of retain Jurisdiction. We have a 14 concurrent sentence of 14 years, consisting of four years 
15 number of rider programs. And you would either be 15 fixed followed by ten years indeterminate. 
16 sentenced to a CAPP Rider or a traditional rlder. I 16 I will order that you pay the restitution that 
17 don't know. But In any event, you'll be back before this 17 you have agreed. I will order that you ~ay all of those 
18 Court probably with a recommendation of probation in 18 court costs and statutory assessments t at are authorized 
19 about six months. And I wouldn't give you probatron In 19 by law in a case of this sort as to each of those counts. 
20 six months. 20 Because of the magnitude of your restitution obligation, 
21 And so I think it would give you a false 21 I'm not golnr to order that you pay a fine In this case. 
22 promise, false ho~e If I were to retain jurisdiction. 22 We wil calculate and give you credit for the 
23 Because I would ave no Intention on this record of 23 time that rcu have served prior to today's sentencing. 
24 admitting you back In the community alter only six months 24 I wil order that you have no contact with the 
25 In an Institution. 25 victim In this case or her business. 
33 34 
1 State have any questions about the Court's 1 That's all I have for you, ma'am. Good luck to 
2 disposition? 2 you. 
3 MR. MEDEMA: No, Your Honor. 3 And I'll order reimbursement of $250 as part of 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Lorello? 4 the assessment for the public def ender's off Ke. 
5 MR. LORELLO: Your Honor, was that a four plus 5 Thank you. 
6 ten on both counts? 6 
7 THE COURT: Concurrent. 7 (End of proceedings.) 
8 MR. LORELLO: Concurrent. Thank you. 8 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 9 
10 Ms. Grasser, I advise 7oou, ma'am, that you have 10 
11 the right to appeal •• eyes orward, ma'am. 11 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Pardon me. 12 
13 THE COURT: I advise you that you have the right 13 
14 to appeal this Judgment and its terms. You have 42 days 14 
15 from the written entry of this judgment to file that 15 
16 appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court. 16 
17 In that appeal you are entitled to be 17 
18 represented by an attorney. If you cannot afford an 18 
19 attorney, one will be appointed for ru at State exrinse 19 
20 and as a needy person, the costs o that appeal wl I be 20 
21 paid for by the State. 21 
22 At this point, ma'am1 I remand you to the 22 23 custody of the Ada County Sheriff for delivery to the 23 
24 proper agent of the state board of corrections in 24 
25 execution of your service. 25 
35 36 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL OJSTRI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A.µA. 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBORAH DEANNE LAFAVE 
aka GRASSER, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-FE-2014-0017499 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER l) DENYING RULE 35 
MOTION; AND 2) GRANTING 
ADDITIONAL CREDIT FOR TIME 
SERVED 
NSON 
After Deborah Derume LaFave aka Grasser pleaded guilty to two counts of Grand Theft, 
on April 8, 2015, the Court sentenced her to concurrent fourteen (14) year lem1s, with four (4) 
years fixed. A Judgment of Conviction and Commitment was entered on April 9, 2015. 
LaFavc; by and through counsel Michael Lojek, Ada County Deputy Public Defender, 
timcly1 filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave, with supporting evidence 
and memorandum, on August 4, 2015. On August 5, October 14, November 9, December 8, 
December 15, December 29, 2015, January 7, and January 15, 2016, LoFave filed additional 
supporting documentation and iufonuution. The State filed an opposition to the motion for 
leniency on September 22, 2015. The Court has reviewed all of these sul>missiorss. LuFaw 
1 "Motions to correct or modify sentence under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment 
imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction .... " !.C.R. 35(b). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 1) DENYING RULE 35 MOTION; AND 2) GRANTING ADDITIONAL CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - PAGE 1 
Aug. p.80 
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requests leniency al\d moves the Cou11 lo reduce her fixed sentence to no more than two (2) 
)'Cars and her indeterminate sc11tence to no more than twelve (12) years. LaFave also moves thi~ 
court to nmcnd or correct the judgment to rcOec:I credit for time served in the a11101111I of one 
hundred and six (106) days. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Reconsider 
"A Ruic 35 motion essentially is a plea for leniency that may he granted if the sentence 
imposed was, for any rcoson, unduly severe. Srate v. McCulloch, 133 Idaho 351, 352, 986 P.2d 
1017, 1018 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Puga, 114 ldaho 117,118,753 P.2d 1263, 1264 
(Ct.App.1987). The decision wht:thcr to reduce a lcg11l sentence is commilled to the discretion of 
the sentencing court. S/(l{e \', Jwguirrr., 145 Idaho 820, 822, 186 P.3<1 676,678 (Ct./\pp.2008). 
The juoge may consider fuels presented at the orieinal sentencing as well as any new infonnalion 
conceming the defendant's rchobilitntivc progress in conlincmcnt. Puga, 1 M ldnho nt 118, 7S3 
l'.2d al 1264; Stale 1•. 'f'orres, 107 Idaho 895, 898, 693 P.2d I 097, 1100 (Ct.App. 1984)." State v. 
Martinez, 154 ldnho 940,948,303 l'.Jd 627, 63S (Ct. App. 2013). 
For purposes of 1mnlyzing a sentence, n courl analyzes the entire sentence, both fixed and 
indetcnn!nntc. Stale v. H11{/i11an, 144 Idaho 20 I, 202, I S9 P.Jd 838, 839 (2007); State v. Olii•er, 
144 ldaho 722, 726, l'/0 P.'.\d 387,391 (2007). The court presumes that the lix1:d portion of the 
sentcnco will be the deftmdRnt's probable term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726 (dting 
Stale v. 1hM110, 132 ldaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 ( l 999)). As a general rule, "tt senlcnce fixed 
within the limits pl'escribed by statute ordinarily will not be consiclered an abuse of cliscr~tion by 
the trial con rt." Stare v. Nice, I 03 fdaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d '.123, 324 (1982). 
. For a sentence to be considered rcnsonahle, at the time of sentencing the com! must tnke 
MEMORANDUM l)ECISION AND ORDER 1) DENYING RULE 35 MOTCON; AND 2) GRANTING ADnITIONAL CREDIT FOR TIME SERV 1m - PAGE l 
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into consideration lhe objectives of sentencing: whether confinement i!. necessary to accomplish 
the objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the rc!ated goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation. or retribution applicable to lhe case. Stale v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 
P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). This requires a court lo focus on the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v, Reinke. 103 Idaho 
771,772,653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). 
LaFavc argues that the sentence was excessive considering any view of the evidence 
under any view of the evjdence. The Court does not agree. The Court impos~J concurrent 
sentences within the limits of the statute. The Court did not impose consecutive sentences. 
In any sentencing, the primary focus begins with a concern for protection of the public. In 
1his case, LaFave pled guilty to Counts I and U, Grand Tlu::fl. For each count the Court imposed 
an aggregate term of fourteen (14) years, with a minimum period of confinement of four years, 
followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed ten years. The mllximum 
penalty for this offense is fourteen years. The fixed portion of a se-J1tence imposed under the 
Unified Sentencing Act i~ t~eated as the li;:rrn of confinement for sentence revic.:w purposes. Stale 
v. Huyes, 123 Idaho 26, ?,7, 843 P.2d 675, 676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds that a four year 
fixed sentence fur Grand Theft is entirely appropriate considering LaFave's prior criminal 
history, the facts of this crime, and all mitigating foctors such as her mental health issues, any 
remorse, and her family and other support. Furthermore, the Court considered the entirety of the 
sentence, including any indctenninate time. 
1n arriving at this sentence, the Conrt considered LaFave's character and any mitigatiug 
or aggravating factors. The Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in this 
case - suggesting the need for this sentence. In particular, it is clear that LaFaw needs to be 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER l) DENYING RULE 3S MOTION; AND 2) GRANTING ADDITIONAL CREDI1' FOR TIME SERVED - PAGE 3 
Aug. p.82 
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deterred from future crimes. The Court's decision focused on rchabiliMion, retribution and the 
protection of society. The facts of this crime and her criminal history suggested the nee<I for this 
sentence ln order to properly rehabilitate her. 
This was her second felony, which includes a previous conviction of eight (8) counts or 
felony Theft in Wnshi11gton in 2007, with striking similarities to the present case. J .nl'ave goincd 
a position of1rust in a Wnshington r.ompany she wos employed uy. LaFavc took advantoge of the 
owner's trust to ~teal more than $130,000. Once convicted, LaFave only served eleven (J l) of 
her twenty-two (22) month prison senti.:nce. LaFnve's misdemeanor record includes Driving 
\ll\dcr the Influence (2010) and Driving with License Sltspended or Revoked (20 I 0). 
In the present case, Lftl~nvc was hired by Perfominnce Systems, Inc., where she gained 
her employer's tnist quir.kly. nnsed on L11F1we's actions she was given addilional tasks and 
responsibilities within the company, including m1thorily to use the company credit cnrd. Within a 
short nmount of time, L11Fave was promoted from nccounts payable support lo Human Resources 
Manager/Payables Support. Eventually, J .11F1wc. started to use the company credit curd for hi.:r 
personnl use, opened n Cupitnl One credit card in the owner's nome ond overpaid on her vacation 
and holiday µay. In a six month time period LaF:we's thefts resulted in o Joss of more than 
$40,000 to her employer. In the Court's view, the sentences were entirely appropriate and 
rcosonablc. In determining to imposo a sentence of imp1isunmcnt, thi.: coiirt carefully reviewed 
tht: fai.:tors set forth In Idaho Code § 19-2521 ond recited on the record al sentencing why these 
factors mi litatcd in favor of a sentence of imprisu111m:11t. 
Where the sentence Is not excessive when pronounced, the· dcfcnd1111t must show thot it is 
excessive in view of new or additionnl evidence presented with the motion for rc<luctlo11. State v. 
Hernandez, 121 Idaho I 14, I I 7, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. Ap~. 1991 ). The Court has reviewed 
MEMORANDUM DECJSION AND ORDI.;R 1) DENYING IWLE 35 MOTIONi ANll 2) GRANTING ADDITIONAi, CREDIT FOR TIME SERV£D- l'AGE 4 
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LoFnve's letters dated June 9, 201S, June 30, July 2, July 8, July ?.O, July 22, September 30, 
November, 3, December 21 , 20 IS, January 2 and January 11, 2016, the undntcd le lier from her 
aunt, Nadeen Clark, the fone 16, 2015 letter from her parents. The Coml has reviewed the rDOC 
progress notes. The Court recognizes that LaFnve has the continued support of her family. The 
Coul't recognizes that L11Favc is trying to make the bcsl of her time in prison by working, seeking 
to cngago in trentmcnl, 11nd making plnns to lcucl H prod\1ctive life when she is relensed. The 
Court recognizes that her pc1rents have health issues und LaFavc would like to be uble 10 help out 
at home. However, none of this persuades the Court thnt the original sentence was excessive. 
As an exercise of discretion, the Comt will dcnr <he motion to reduce the sentence 11s 
requested by LaFave. 
B. Credit for Time Servcil 
LnFnvc requests a correction for credit for time served. Judgine11t wns entered against 
LnFnve on April 9, 7.015, in a Judgment of Conviction nnd Commitment. Therein, LuFnve wns 
given credit for lime served in the amount of ninety-seven (97) days. Lntlnvc n~serts she was 
mrestcd in Kelso, \Vc1shington on December 23, 2014, pursuant to an arrest wnrranl related to the 
underlying crime in this action. The Court has confinned that this is correct one\ will amend the 
Judgment of Conviction to provide for credit of 106 days (December 23, 20 14 to April 9, 2015). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ day of JMuary, 2016. 
~ll~
-·-~
 
n,~trict Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAI[,JNG 
I hereby certify that on tho 21 day of Janunry, 2016, I mailed (served) ti true .ind correct 
copy of the within inslnnnen! to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
VIA EMAIL 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENlJHR'8 OFFICE 
VIAEMAJL 
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